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AMER. HOME v. L & L MARINE (Cont.)
contributed equally to the accident and the weather encountered
was not so unusual as to be unforeseeable.
The resulting damages were properly allocated among the
parties proportionally according to the comparative degree of
their fault. L&L had neither a vessel interest nor a cargo interest
and could not be considered a contributing participant in a

proper, it did not include the costs of hull repair and cargo
lightering. For this reason the damage award is vacated and
remanded for reconsideration.
.
The work done by the tug Jaguar was properly classified as
towage. It was the Cost Guard vessel on the scene that actually
performed the crucial act of rescue by attaching the floating
hawser to the Maya, and the Jaguar then merely pulled the

common nautical venture. L&L was sued merely as a tortfeasor
and the concept of general-average adjustment, as used by the
other parties to adjust the damages among themselves, does not
apply. While the district court's allocation of damages was

Maya off the Shoal. The finding of the district court that this
work would properly be classified as towage rather than salvage
was affirmed.
Stephen W. Beyer '92

CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC.

v. FERREIRA

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 28 March1989
871 F.2 d830
Shipowner cannot sue seaman, whose negligence allegedly caused injury to co-seaman, for indemnification or contribution
based upon shipowner's Jones Act liability to said co-seaman.
FACTS: In January 1985, Manuel Rebelo, a crewmember of
the M/V Pan Pacific, sustained personal injuries on board the
vessel. Rebelo filed a claim for maintenance and cure. In re
sponse to Rebelo's claim, the shipowners, California Home
Brands Inc. (CHB), commenced an action for declaratory relief,
denying responsibility for maintenance and cure. Rebelo
counterclaimed for negligence under the Jones Act, unsea
worthiness, and maintence and cure.
CHB commenced a separate action against Danny Ferreira,
a co-seaman, for contribution and/or indemnification, claiming
Ferreira's puported negligence contributed to Rebelo's injuries.
Ferreira, moved to dismiss CHB's complaint and after a hearing,
the trial court held that CHB's suit against its own employee for
indemnity and contribution was barred as a matter of law.
ISSUE: Is a shipowner-employer who may be liable to an
injured seaman-employee under the Jones Act entitled to such
indemnity and contribution from a co-seaman whose negligence
allegedly caused the injury?
ANALYSIS: In its affirmation of the district court's decision,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgement for
Ferreira despite numerous arguments by CHB for indemnification
and contribution.
The Court explicitly declined to recognize conventional land
based tort liability theories regarding indemnity or contribution
from fellow employees, continuing to be guided by rules specifically
developed in the context of maritime employment.
Traditional maritime law recognized only two claims by a
seaman injured in the course of employment - a seaman injured
while on board a vessel was entitled to "maintenance and cure"
(which included wages until the end of the voyage), and recovery
of damages for injuries sustained due to the unseaworthiness of
the ship The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). A vessel owner's duty
to provide such "maintenance and cure" is implied as part of the
employment contract, and this duty is not subject to abrogation
by the parties. Similarly, the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy
ship is absolute; once a seaman proved that his injuries were
caused by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel or its equipment,
the shipowner was liable regardless of fault. Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1912). The common law concept
of negligence as a basis for tort liability was not extended to
employment injuries at sea until passage of the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. §688 (1920), which created a negligence right of action
for seamen against their employers. CHB argued that if Congress
had intended to protect seamen from personal liability, the
Jones Act would have included an express immunizing provision.
The Court refused to accept this rationale, stating that the
purpose of the Act was to benefit and protect seamen by enlarging
the remedies available to them. The Court concluded that to
interpret the statute to allow lawsuits against seamen would

frustrate the beneficial purpose of the Act.
CHB attempted to further advance its cause of action against
Ferreira under principles of maritime indemnity and contribution
established under two prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 482 (1952) andCooperStevedoringCorp. Inc. v.FritzKople
Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). In Halcyon, a shipowner was sued by a
longshoreman for injuries sustained on board a vessel. The
shipowner sought to implead the longshoreman's employer,
who was otherwise exempted by statute, as a third party de
fendant. The Supreme Court held that no right of contribution
existed in such non-collision maritime cases. In Cooper, an
injured longshoreman sued the vessel owner, who later imp
leaded the non employer, stevedoring company as a third party
defendant. The Supreme Court held that the vessel owner was
entitled to implead such stevedoring company as a joint tort
feasor. CHB's attempt to wed these holdings to the facts of the
case at bar was held to be too sweeping. The Court indicated that
unless a direct cause of action exists by one seaman against
another for shipboard injuries, the employer can have no right of
indemnification or contribution from the employee.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's hold
ing that before any statutory rights were created, a seaman
could not sue his co-employee for negligence. The Court in
interpreting the Jones Act concluded that Ferreira could not be
directly liable to Rebelo and therefore, no basis existed for
CHB's claim for indemnity against Ferreira. See, CHB. Foods,
Inc. v. Rebelo, 662 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.CAL.1987).
CHB also argued that it had a right to indemnity from Fer
reira on an implied contractual basis, citing the "primary duty
rule" adopted in Reinhart u. United States, 475 F.2d 151 (9th
Cir. 1972). (Seaman-employee may not recover from his employer
for injuries caused by his own failure to perform a duty imposed
on him by his employment.) The Court held that Reinhart had
no application in this case because the primary duty rule works
only to bar a plaintiffs suit for damages when his injury resulted
from his own breach. It does not create any rights against third
parties. Given the conditions of maritime employment, the imp
lication of a covenant of workmanlike performance running
from the seaman to his employer and entitling the latter to
indemnity is not a reasonable one. SeeFlunker v. UnitedStates,
528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975).
Finally, the policy arguments advanced by CHB for indemnity
and contribution were rejected by the Court as not in keeping
with the history and purpose of the Jones Act. The Court cone
! uded that to subject a seaman to the costs of defending a lawsuit
by his employer and the threat of ultimate liability would place
an intolerable burden on what is already considered a difficult
occupation. See Socony-Vacume Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424
(1939).
Alfonso C. Pistone '91
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